Abstract Introducing a ceiling on total carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and allowing polluting industries to buy and sell permits to meet it (known as a cap-and-trade system) affects investment strategies, generation quantities, and prices in electricity markets. In this paper we analyze these...

Keywords: investment modeling in electricity markets, energy policy, renewable energy obligations, green certificates, technology bandings, perfect competition equilibrium

Abstract: This paper shows that, if countries are farsighted when deciding whether to defect from a coalition, then the implementation of cleaner technologies may jeopardize the chances of reaching an international environmental agreement. The grand coalition may be destabilized by the...

In the absence of a successful international cooperative agreement over the control of emissions there is a growing interest in the role that clean technologies may play to alleviate the climate change problem. Within a non-cooperative transboundary pollution game, we investigate, analytically...

This paper studies the interplay between climate, health, and the economy in a stylized world with four heterogeneous regions, labeled ‘West’ (cold and rich), ‘China’ (cold and poor), ‘India’ (warm and poor), and ‘Africa’ (warm and very poor). We introduce health impacts into a...

Abstract: This paper determines the optimal timing of dike heightenings as well as the corresponding optimal dike heightenings to protect against floods. To derive the optimal policy we design an algorithm based on the Impulse Control Maximum Principle. In this way the paper presents one of the...

In a bilateral trade framework, we examine the impact of tari¤ reduction on the op- timal pollution tax and social welfare when pollution is transboundary. Strategic considerations lead countries to distort their pollution tax in the non-cooperative equilibrium. Trade liberalization changes the...

Abstract: This paper studies fiscal federalism when voter information varies across regions. We develop a model of political agency with heterogeneously informed voters. Rentseeking politicians provide public goods to win the votes of the informed. As a result, rent extraction is lower in...

We show that an environmental regulation such as a tax on pollution can act as a collusive device and induce stable cartelization in an oligopolistic polluting industry. We consider a dynamic game where pollution is allowed to accumulate into a stock over time and a cartel that includes all the...

This paper explores how the costs of meeting given aggregate targets for pollution emissions change with the imposition of the requirement that key pollution-related industries be compensated for potential losses of profit from the pollution regulation.Using analytically and numerically solved...