Abstract: We analyze a two-stage game of strategic firms facing uncertain demand and exerting market power in decentralized electricity markets. These firms choose their generation capacities at the first stage while anticipating a perfectly competitive future electricity spot market outcome at...

The paper considers a model of imitation in the context of Cournot oligopoly. Purely imitative behavior can lead to an outcome inconsistent with Nash equilibrium. The question is when we can reconcile imitation with the concept of Nash equilibrium. The paper extends purely imitative behavior in...

We model a player’s uncertainty about other players’ strategy choices as smooth probability distributions over their strategy sets. We call a strategy profile (strictly) robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence (all sequences) of strategy...

In the most liberalized electricity markets, abuse of market power is a concern related to oligopolistic market structures, flaws in market architecture, and the specific characteristics of electricity generation and demand. Several methods have been suggested to improve the competitiveness of...

This paper provides a non-linear pricing rule for the valuation of assets on financial markets with intermediaries.The non-linearity arises from the fact that dealers charge a price for their intermediation between buyer and seller. The pricing rule we propose is an alternative for the wellknown...

The two major methods of explaining economic institutions, namely by strategic choices or by (indirect) evolution, are compared for the case of a homogenous quadratic duopoly market. Sellers either can provide incentives for their agents to care for sales (amounts) or evolve as sellers who care...

In this paper we experimentally investigate the extended game with observable delay of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ.Beh., 1990).Firms bindingly announce a production period (one out of two periods) and then they produce in the announced sequence.Theory predicts simultaneous production in...

This paper argues that the efficiency distribution of players in a game determines how aggressively these players interact.We formalize the idea of balance of power: players fight very inefficient players but play softly versus equally (or more) efficient players.This theory of conduct predicts...