Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the literature.For games with a coalition structure, the Shapley value also has been axiomatized in several ways.In this paper, we discuss a generalization of the Shapley value to the class of partition function form games.The...

This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in a situation where coalitions impose externalities on other players. It is shown that an agreement will be reached without delay provided that any set of coalitions profit from merging. Even under this...

This paper studies noncooperative bargaining with random proposers in proper single games. A power index is called consistent if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game with random proposers using the index itself as probability vector. Unlike the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices, the...

This paper studies coalition formation and payoff division in apex games under the following assumptions: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may...

Abstract: We report results from three well-known experimental paradigms, where we use time, rather than money, as the salient component of subjects’ incentives. The three experiments, commonly employed to study social preferences, are the dictator game, the ultimatum game and the trust game....

AMS Classifications: 91A06; 91A10; 91A12

One of the long-standing puzzles in economics is why wages do not fall sufficiently in recessions so as to avoid increases in unemployment. Put differently, if the competitive market wage declines, why don't employers simply force their employees to accept lower wages as well? As an alternative...

We study social preferences in a three-person ultimatum game experiment with one proposer and two responders.Any responder can unilaterally punish the proposer.In three treatments, we vary the pecuniary consequences of rejection in such a way that upon rejection of one responder the other...

We consider the problem of control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the decision makers into a structure of formal authority relationships.Within such a structure, decision makers act as principal to some decision makers, while they act as agent to other decision makers.We study...

The concede-and-divide rule is a basic solution for bankruptcy problems with two claimants.An extension of the concede-and-divide rule to bankruptcy problems with more than two claimants is provided.This extension not only uses the concede-and-divide principle in its procedural definition, but...