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Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964459

The Impact of Lobbying on the Allocation of Political Authority

Falconieri, Sonia - Tinbergen Institute - 2001

This paper studies the internal organizational design of political institutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a … pattern of the feasible policies. In this context, we investigate the impact of lobbying on the optimal allocation of … of lobbying, the effectiveness of a closed rule as an incentive device towards the committee is noticeably reduced while …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137098

Credit Rationing Effects of Credit Value-at-Risk

Slijkerman, Jan Frederik; Smant, David J.C.; Vries, … - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

Banks provide risky loans to firms which have superior information regarding the quality of their projects. Due to asymmetric information the banks face the risk of adverse selection. Credit Value-at-Risk (CVaR) regulation counters the problem of low quality, i.e. high risk, loans and therefore...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136889

Demand Reduction and Preemptive Bidding in Multi-Unit License Auctions

Goeree, Jacob; Offerman, Theo; Sloof, Randolph - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

Multi-unit ascending auctions allow for equilibria in which bidders strategically reduce their demand and split the market at low prices. At the same time, they allow for preemptive bidding by incumbent bidders in a coordinated attempt to exclude entrants from the market. We consider an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137025

Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control

Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

We identify the conditions under which voters can induce political parties to collect information and to select policies which are optimal from the representative voter’s point of view. We show that when parties are office motivated the voting rule should encourage parties to collect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016251

Does Electoral Competition create Incentives for Political Parties to collect Information about the Pros and Cons of Alternative Policies?

Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

A well-known rationale for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a free-rider problem as to the collection of information. A problem with this rationale is that it takes for granted that representatives collect information. In this paper we examine whether or not electoral...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016253

Is Transparency to no avail? Committee Decision-making, Pre-meetings, and Credible Deals

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Institute - 2007

Transparent decision-making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the working of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability, and citizens may suspect that decisions, if taken behind closed doors, do not promote their interests. Why else the secrecy? We provide a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144398

Transparency and Pre-meetings

Swank, Job; Swank, Otto; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

Some committees are made up of experts, persons interested in both the (subject) matter at hand and in coming across as able decision-makers. Such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. We present a theory that describes the reaction of experts to the requirement to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144492

Household Inequality, Welfare, and the Setting of Trade Policy

Francois, Joseph; Rojas-Romagosa, Hugo - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

We analyze general equilibrium relationships between trade policy and the household distribution of income, decomposing social welfare into real income level and variance components through Gini and Atkinson indexes. We embed these inequality-adjusted social welfare functions in a general...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144496

How Polarization and Political Instability affect Learning through Experimentation

Ossokina, Ioulia V.; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2001

In a multiperiod setting, decision-makers can learn about the consequences of their decisions through experimentation. In this paper we examine how in a two-party system polarization and political instability affect learning through experimentation. We distinguish two cases: <OL> <LI>the decision to be...</li></ol>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144519