This discussion paper has resulted in ch. 4 of <A href="http://books.google.nl/books?hl=nl&lr=&id=edksC0nRPZYC&oi=fnd&pg=PR7&dq=allesintitel:+%22Labor+Market+Institutions+and+Public+Regulation%22&ots=-umxBkjdnT&sig=oeFDTjhnSeo-w-4nuTjTJpuaUr8#v=onepage&q=&f=false">'Labor Market Institutions and Public Regulation'</A>, pp. 123-61, (Jonas Agell, Michael Keen, Alfons Weichenrieder (eds.)), 2004, MIT Press, 228 p.

This study documents two empirical regularities, using data for Denmark and Portugal. First, workers who are hired last, are the first to leave the firm (Last In, First Out; LIFO). Second, workers’ wages rise with seniority (= a worker’s tenure relative to the tenure of her colleagues). We...

We present an experimental test of a shirking model where monitoring intensity is endogenous and effort a continuous variable. Wage level, monitoring intensity and consequently the desired enforceable effort level are jointly determined by the maximization problem of the firm. As a result,...

We present a structural framework for the evaluation of public policies intended to increase job search intensity. Most of the literature defines search intensity as a scalar that influences the arrival rate of job offers; here we treat it as the number of job applications that workers send out....

Estimators of regression coefficients are known to be asymptotically normally distributed, provided certain regularity conditions are satisfied. In small samples and if the noise is not normally distributed, this can be a poor guide to the quality of the estimators. The paper addresses this...