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Peer Evaluation: Incentives and Co-Worker Relations

Sol, Joeri - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838534

Brandts, Jordi; Riedl, Arno; Winden, Frans van - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

We study the effects of competition in a context in which people's actions can not be contractually fixed. We find that in such an environment the very presence of competition does neither increase efficiency nor does it yield any payoff gains for the short side of the market. We also find that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136861

Gift Exchange in the Workplace

Dur, Robert - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

We develop a model of manager-employee relationships where employees care more for their manager when they are more convinced that their manager cares for them. Managers can signal their altruistic feelings towards their employees in two ways: by offering a generous wage and by giving attention....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136961

Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations

Dur, Robert; Roelfsema, Hein - Tinbergen Institute - 2006

We study the relation between formal incentives and social exchange in organizations where employees work for several managers and reciprocate to a manager's attention with higher effort. To this end we develop a common agency model with two-sided moral hazard. We show that when effort is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136973

The Breakdown of Morale

Vikander, Nick - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

This paper studies how morale in teams can break down. It interprets high morale as team members working together productively, either because of a sense of fairness or because of implicit incentives from repeated interactions. Team members learn that lay-offs will occur at a fixed future date,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005209501

Employee Types and Endogenous Organizational Design

Cunyat, Antoni; Sloof, Randolph - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

When managers are sufficiently guided by social preferences, incentive provision through an organizational mode based on informal implicit contracts may provide a cost-effective alternative to a more formal mode based on explicit contracts and monitoring. This paper reports the results from a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144530

Social Interaction, Co-Worker Altruism, and Incentives

Dur, Robert; Sol, Joeri - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker relationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where agents do not only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004987441

Better Safe than Sorry? Ex Ante and Ex Post Moral Hazard in Dynamic Insurance Data

Abbring, Jaap; Chiappori, Pierre-André; Zavadil, Tibor - Tinbergen Institute - 2008

This paper empirically analyzes moral hazard in car insurance using a dynamic theory of an insuree's dynamic risk (ex ante moral hazard) and claim (ex post moral hazard) choices and Dutch longitudinal micro data. We use the theory to characterize the heterogeneous dynamic changes in incentives...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137061

Decomposing the Gender Wage Gap in the Netherlands with Sample Selection Adjustments

Albrecht, James; Vuuren, Aico van; Vroman, Susan - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

, sample selection is a serious issue. In addition to shedding light on the sources of the gender gap in the Netherlands, we … de- signed to simulate. Second, we show how the technique can be extended to account for selection. We find that there is … a positive selection of women into full-time work in the Netherlands, i.e., women who get the greatest return to working …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137387

Social Experiments and Instrumental Variables with Duration Outcomes

Abbring, Jaap H.; Berg, Gerard J. van den - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

This paper examines the empirical analysis of treatment effects on duration outcomes from data that contain instrumental variation. We focus on social experiments in which an intention to treat is randomized and compliance may be imperfect. We distinguish between cases where the treatment starts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504899