A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...

The article is forthcoming in <A href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi=B6VFD-4PNM471-3&_user=499884&_coverDate=09%2F15%2F2007&_alid=770199288&_rdoc=1&_fmt=high&_orig=search&_cdi=6008&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_ct=1&_acct=C000024499&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_userid=499884&md5=8492c97b78d795d5deec06a94b66422d">Labour Economics</A>.<p><P>

A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls...

This paper explores the meaning and implications of the desire by workers for impact. We find that this impact motive can make a firm in a competitive labor market face an upward-sloping supply curve of labor, lead workers with the same characteristics but at different firms to earn different...