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Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964459

Politicians' Motivation, Political Culture, and Electoral Competition

Beniers, Klaas J.; Dur, Robert - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office. We show that politicians may have stronger incentives to behave...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144528

On the Dynamics of Interest Group Formation and Endogenous Policymaking

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

We present a dynamic model of the interaction between interest groups and policymakers, featuring endogenous interest group formation. We show that complicated dynamic patterns in economic policies may arise once interest group formation is taken into account. <BR><BR>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136859

Politicians' Motivation, Role of Elections, and Policy Choices

Wrasai, Phongthorn - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

We develop a simple two period model to study the importance of motivational differences among politicians in describing the role of elections and explaining policy choices. In our model, politicians differ in their motives of running public office. Good politicians care about policies while bad...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136888

Why does Centralisation fail to internalise Policy Externalities?

Dur, Robert A.J.; Roelfsema, Hein J. - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

We provide an explanation why centralisation of political decision making

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137012

Do Elections lead to Informed Public Decisions?

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Institute - 2003

Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks to, elections. Elections are needed as a carrot and a stick to motivate...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137020

Party Governance and the Selection of Parliamentarians

Beniers, Klaas J. - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

This paper examines the incentives for a party leader in office and for a parties' rank-and-file to replace a sitting member of parliament. As to the leader's decision, we show that the leader prefers to replace a critical member of parliament who votes against the leader's policy. A competent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137202

The Impact of Lobbying on the Allocation of Political Authority

Falconieri, Sonia - Tinbergen Institute - 2001

This paper studies the internal organizational design of political institutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a … pattern of the feasible policies. In this context, we investigate the impact of lobbying on the optimal allocation of … of lobbying, the effectiveness of a closed rule as an incentive device towards the committee is noticeably reduced while …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137098

Experimental Public Choice

Schram, Arthur J.H.C. - Tinbergen Institute - 2002

experiments on public goods, participation games, rent-seeking and lobbying, and spatial voting. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136963

Trade Reform and Labor Market Dynamics

Botman, Dennis P.J.; Tieman, Alexander F. - Tinbergen Institute - 1999

We present an equilibrium-search model with heterogenous workers who search for a job in one of two sectors and who lose part of their skills during unemployment. We show that an import tariff increase the wage and the employment prospects in the protected sector. This results in a labor market...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136869