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Identification of Voters with Interest Groups improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans van - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior,these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513247

On the Dynamics of Interest Group Formation and Endogenous Policymaking

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans A.A.M. van - Tinbergen Institute - 2000

We present a dynamic model of the interaction between interest groups and policymakers, featuring endogenous interest group formation. We show that complicated dynamic patterns in economic policies may arise once interest group formation is taken into account. <BR><BR>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136859

On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans van - Tinbergen Institute - 2005

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136910

Lobbying of Firms by Voters

Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Institute - 2009

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964459

The Impact of Lobbying on the Allocation of Political Authority

Falconieri, Sonia - Tinbergen Institute - 2001

This paper studies the internal organizational design of political institutions in presence of lobbying. We consider a … pattern of the feasible policies. In this context, we investigate the impact of lobbying on the optimal allocation of … of lobbying, the effectiveness of a closed rule as an incentive device towards the committee is noticeably reduced while …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137098

Importance of E-services for Cultural Tourism

Leeuwen, Eveline van; Nijkamp, Peter - Tinbergen Institute - 2011

Despite a busy lifestyle – or perhaps as a result of a stressful lifestyle – more people than ever before make leisure trips, sometimes for a long time but in many cases just for short periods. Modern telecommunication technology brings attractive tourist destinations directly into the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009201136

The Economics of Information in Transport

Rietveld, Piet - Tinbergen Institute - 2010

Travelers often are incompletely informed about travel alternatives, which has important implications for various domains of travel behavior such as whether or not to make a trip, modal choice, the timing of a trip or route choice. During the last decade large efforts have been made to increase...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008838592

Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control

Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

We identify the conditions under which voters can induce political parties to collect information and to select policies which are optimal from the representative voter’s point of view. We show that when parties are office motivated the voting rule should encourage parties to collect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016251

Does Electoral Competition create Incentives for Political Parties to collect Information about the Pros and Cons of Alternative Policies?

Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Institute - 2004

A well-known rationale for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a free-rider problem as to the collection of information. A problem with this rationale is that it takes for granted that representatives collect information. In this paper we examine whether or not electoral...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016253

Is Transparency to no avail? Committee Decision-making, Pre-meetings, and Credible Deals

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Institute - 2007

Transparent decision-making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the working of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability, and citizens may suspect that decisions, if taken behind closed doors, do not promote their interests. Why else the secrecy? We provide a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144398