This paper studies markets plagued with asymmetric information on the quality of traded goods. In Akerlof's setting, sellers are better informed than buyers. In contrast, we examine cases where buyers are better informed than sellers. This creates an inverse adverse selection problem: The market...

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the <I>Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization</I> (2008), volume 66, pages 243-250.<P> We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. This alllows us to testvarious models in one framework. We observe a large extent of selfish and...</p></i>

This paper develops one possible argument why auctioning licenses to op-erate in an aftermarket may lead to higher prices in the aftermarket comparedto a more random allocation mechanism. Key ingredients in the argumentare differences in firms' risk attitudes and the fact that future market...

We analyze sequential Dutch and Vickrey auctions where risk averse, or risk preferring, bidders may have heterogeneous risk exposures. We derive and characterize a pure strategy equilibrium of both auctions for arbitrary number of identical objects. A sufficient, and to certain extent necessary,...

We analyze the effects of mergers in first-price sealed-bid auctions on bidders' equilibrium bidding functions and on revenue. We also study the incentives of bidders to merge given the private information they have. We develop two models, depending on how after-merger valuations are created. In...

Using simple game-theoretical models, this paper studies the role of pre-determined rules for HRM policies. We consider a model in which HRM decisions affect employees' self-images and thereby their motivation. We show that in the absence of written rules, managers are too reluctant (1) to...

We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...

This discussion paper resulted in an article in the 'Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization' (2007). Volume 62, pages 579-590.<P> When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in...</p>

We test the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), a stability measure and refinement for cheap talk equilibria introduced in De Groot Ruiz, Offerman & Onderstal (2011b). ACDC has been shown to be predictive under general conditions and to organize data well in previous experiments meant...