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Brink, Rene van den; Katsev, Ilya; Laan, Gerard van der - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257183

Cooperative Games in Graph Structure

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf - Tinbergen Instituut - 2000

ones. We then define the balanced-core as a refinement ofthe core. A payoff vector lies in the balanced-core if it lies in … the core andthe payoff vector is an element of payoff sets of all graphs in some balanced collection ofgraphs. We prove … that any balanced graph game has a nonempty balanced-core.We conclude by some examples showing the usefulness of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255644

The Balanced Solution for Co-operative Transferable Utility Games

Brink, René van den; Levinsky, René; Zeleny, Miroslav - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007

The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividend of each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weights for all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividends proportionally to their weights. In this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257553

Computation of the Nucleolus for a Class of Disjunctive Games with a Permission Structure

Brink, René van den; Katsev, Ilya; Laan, Gerard van der - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008

-game. A well-known solution is the nucleolus. A cooperative game with a permission structure describes a situation in which … polynomial time algorithm for computing the nucleolus of the restricted games corresponding to a class of games with permission …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256279

An Algorithm for Computing the Nucleolus of Disjunctive Additive Games with An Acyclic Permission Structure

Brink, René van den; Katsev, Ilya; Laan, Gerard van der - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008

distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the nucleolus. A cooperative game with a permission structure describes a … computing the nucleolus of every restricted game corresponding to some disjunctive non-negative additive game with an acyclic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257037

Two Values for Transferable Utility Games with Coalition and Graph Structure

Brink, Rene van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

This discussion paper led to a publication in 'TOP' (forthcoming).<P> In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for transferable utility games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game....</p>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255446

Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations

Brink, René van den; Gilles, Robert P. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2003

In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the relevant decisionmakers into a general structure of formal authority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a principal to some decision makers, while...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255955

The Prediction Value

Koster, Maurice; Kurz, Sascha; Lindner, Ines; Napel, Stefan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013

We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players’ informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i’s prediction value equals the difference between the conditional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256041

The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008

-convexity, under which the game is shown to have a non-empty core and the average tree solution lies in the core. In general, link …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255465

Demand Adjustment in Coalitional Games

Laan, Gerard van der; Pruzhansky, Vitaly - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

This paper associates a strategic n-person game with a given transferable utility game and studies its Nash equilibria. Strict equilibria in this model characterize those divisions of social surplus that can become conventions in the sense of Young (1993). It is shown that even in relatively...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255790