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Delegation or Voting
Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Instituut - 2002
qualityhas been acquired or not, we compare the performance of a delegation structure with that oftwo voting procedures …. Delegation makes one's acceptance decision pivotal by definition.The decisiveness of one's vote in a voting procedure depends on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257239
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Lobbying of Firms by Voters
Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009
A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257421
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Mostly Sunny: A Forecast of Tomorrow's Power Index Research
Kurz, Sascha; Maaser, Nicola; Napel, Stefan; Weber, Matthias - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014
Power index research has been a very active field in the last decades. Will this continue or are all the important questions solved? We argue that there are still many opportunities to conduct useful research with and on power indices. Positive and normative questions keep calling for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272591
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Is Transparency to no avail? Committee Decision-making, Pre-meetings, and Credible Deals
Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Instituut - 2007
Transparent decision-making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the working of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability, and citizens may suspect that decisions, if taken behind closed doors, do not promote their interests. Why else the secrecy? We provide a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255492
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The Prediction Value
Koster, Maurice; Kurz, Sascha; Lindner, Ines; Napel, Stefan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2013
We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players’ informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i’s prediction value equals the difference between the conditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256041
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Choosing Voting Systems behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Two-Tier Voting Experiment
Weber, Matthias - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014
There are many situations in which different groups make collective decisions by committee voting, with each group … represented by a single person. A natural question is what voting system such a committee should use. Concepts based on voting … the choice of voting systems based on such theoretical concepts, in this paper, I ask which systems individuals actually …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256178
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Solving the Inverse Power Problem in Two-Tier Voting Settings
Weber, Matthias - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014
There are many situations in which different groups make collective decisions by committee voting, where each group is … represented by a single person. Theoretical concepts suggest how the voting systems in such committees should be designed, but … these abstract rules can usually not be implemented perfectly. To find voting systems that approximate these rules the so …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256259
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Transparency and Pre-meetings
Swank, Job; Swank, Otto; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Instituut - 2006
Some committees are made up of experts, persons interested in both the (subject) matter at hand and in coming across as able decision-makers. Such committees would like to conceal disagreement from the public. We present a theory that describes the reaction of experts to the requirement to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256388
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On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups
Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans van - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256524
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On Committees of Experts
Visser, Bauke; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005
value of the project and about being considered well informed. Before voting on the project, members can exchange their … differ considerably from those of the member casting the decisive vote. Our last result is that the optimal voting rule …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257003