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Wrasai, Phongthorn; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2004

This discussion paper resulted in an article in the 'Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization' (2007). Volume 62, pages 579-590.<P> When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in...</p>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256246

The Transaction Costs Perspective on Costs And Benefits of Government Regulation

Butter, Frank A.G. den; Graaf, Marc de; Nijsen, André - Tinbergen Instituut - 2009

regulation by taking all transaction costs into account which stem from the principal/agent relationship between regulatory … regulated entities – part of these costs can be regarded as the administrative burden of regulation for the private sector – but … society due to e.g. miscommunication on the aims of regulation, and are, of course, hard to quantify. A cost calculation using …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256942

Deliberation, Information Aggregation and Collective Decision Making

Swank, Otto H.; Wrasai, Phongthorn - Tinbergen Instituut - 2002

We study a model of collective decision making with endogenous information collection.Agents collect information about the consequences of a project, communicate, and then vote onthe project. We examine under what conditions communication may increase the probability thatgood decisions are made....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255757

Do Elections lead to Informed Public Decisions?

Swank, Otto H.; Visser, Bauke - Tinbergen Instituut - 2003

This discussion paper led to a publication in 'Public Choice', 129, 435-460.<P> Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. Using a model in which an incumbent can design, examine and implement public policies, we show that examination takes place in spite of, rather than thanks...</p>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255916

What to put on and what to keep off the Table? A Politician's Choice of which Issues to address

Sayag, Rei S.; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

At the start of their term, politicians often announce which issue they intend to address. To shed light on this agenda setting, we develop a model in which a politician has to decide whether or not to address a public issue. Addressing an issue means that the politician investigates the issue...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256020

Politicians' Motivation, Role of Elections, and Policy Choices

Wrasai, Phongthorn - Tinbergen Instituut - 2005

We develop a simple two period model to study the importance of motivational differences among politicians in describing the role of elections and explaining policy choices. In our model, politicians differ in their motives of running public office. Good politicians care about policies while bad...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257195

Do More Powerful Interest Groups have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy?

Sharif, Zara; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2012

Decisions-makers often rely on information supplied by interested parties. In practice, some parties have easier access to information than other parties. In this light, we examine whether more powerful parties have a disproportionate influence on decisions. We show that more powerful parties...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257417

On the Role of Pre-Determined Rules for HRM Policies

Martinez, Silvia Dominguez; Swank, Otto H. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

Using simple game-theoretical models, this paper studies the role of pre-determined rules for HRM policies. We consider a model in which HRM decisions affect employees' self-images and thereby their motivation. We show that in the absence of written rules, managers are too reluctant (1) to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255571

Power and the Privilege of Clarity: An Analysis of Bargaining Power and Information Transmission

Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

We provide a game theoretic analysis of how power shapes the clarity of communication. We analyze information transmission in a cheap talk bargaining game between an informed Sender and an uninformed Receiver. Theoretically, we find that the maximum amount of information that can be transmitted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256036

An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC

Ruiz, Adrian de Groot; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - Tinbergen Instituut - 2011

We test the Average Credible Deviation Criterion (ACDC), a stability measure and refinement for cheap talk equilibria introduced in De Groot Ruiz, Offerman & Onderstal (2011b). ACDC has been shown to be predictive under general conditions and to organize data well in previous experiments meant...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256353

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