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Auctions and shareholdings.
Ettinger, David - Université Paris-Dauphine - 2008
) function of vertical (resp: horizontal) toeholds. With both types of toeholds, auction formats are not revenue equivalent …. Expected revenue is affected to a greater extent by the presence of toeholds in the second-price auction than in the first …-price auction. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790072
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Takeover contests, toeholds and deterrence.
Ettinger, David - Université Paris-Dauphine - 2009
modeled as an ascending auction with participating costs. The toeholder is more aggressive during the takeover process because …We consider a setting in which two potential buyers, one with a prior toehold and one without, compete in a takeover …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790071
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Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values.
Forges, Françoise; Biran, Omer - Université Paris-Dauphine - 2011
We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024339
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Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values.
Orzach, Ram; Forges, Françoise - Université Paris-Dauphine - 2011
In a commonvalueauction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy et al. [Einy, E., Haimanko, O., Orzach, R., Sela, A.,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493427
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Optimal concession of water services under common value.
Salanié, François; Bontems, Philippe; Aubert, Cécile - Université Paris-Dauphine
When an incumbent firm is in charge of a distribution network, it accumulates information on the state of the network. This `common value' information creates a winner's curse during auctions for renewing the concession. The municipality contracting out the provision of the service trades off...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008551706
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Bidding among friends and enemies with symmetric information.
Ettinger, David - Université Paris-Dauphine - 2010
We consider an auction setting, in a symmetric information framework, in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the … good, care about the price paid by the winner. We prove that the outcome of the first-price auction is not affected by … identity-independent price externalities, while the outcome of the second-price auction is. In contrast, identity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790078
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Long persuasion games.
Koessler, Frédéric; Forges, Françoise - Université Paris-Dauphine - 2008
This paper characterizes geometrically the sets of all Nash and perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009002742
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Regulation of ''Guru'' Analysts' Conflicts of Interest.
Biard, Antoine - Université Paris-Dauphine
Conflicts of interest are the inherent price to pay to benefit from information synergies offered by multiple financial service providers. We focus on conflicts faced by a investment bank's "guru" sell-side analyst, which is torn between the pro-investor research department favoring fair...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008529667
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Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types.
Forges, Françoise; Koessler, Frédéric - Université Paris-Dauphine
This paper studies the set of equilibria that can be achieved by adding general communication systems to Bayesian games in which some information can be certified or, equivalently, in which players’ types are partially verifiable. Certifiability of information is formalized by a set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532318
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Transmission stratégique de l'information et certification.
Koessler, Frédéric; Forges, Françoise - Université Paris-Dauphine - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543994