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This paper examines how shareholdings affect auctions' revenue and efficiency with independent private values. Two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790072
characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024339
In a commonvalueauction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy et al. [Einy, E., Haimanko, O., Orzach, R., Sela, A.,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493427
We consider an auction setting, in a symmetric information framework, in which bidders, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We prove that the outcome of the first-price auction is not affected by identity-independent price externalities, while the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790078
We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008799425
This paper proposes an equilibrium approach to belief manipulation and deception in which agents only have coarse knowledge of their opponent's strategy. Equilibrium requires the coarse knowledge available to agents to be correct, and the inferences and optimizations to be made on the basis of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008790079
We consider two-sided matching markets in which agents have private information on a state of nature which determines the agents' utilities of matching. Monetary transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. The model thus extends the assignment game introduced by Shapley and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532579
. This `common value' information creates a winner's curse during auctions for renewing the concession. The municipality … designed to address this difficulty, with asymmetric auctions in which the incumbent is favored and increasing output schedules …. Contrary to standard auctions, the winner's curse can be prevented at no expected cost. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008551706
La diversité des marchés immobiliers a une conséquence importante : les évolutions conjoncturelles n’ont pas le même impact partout. Quelles sont alors les tendances qui structurent les marchés au-delà de la conjoncture ? Comment s’organisent les circulations résidentielles dans un...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008917395
La mise en relation des prix des logements et de leurs différentes caractéristiques (les localisations, mais aussi les types de biens et même les types d’acteurs) est rendue possible par le traitement statistique des bases de données. Un nouveau champ d’investigation pour mieux...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008675359