Dans le cadre théorique du gouvernement d'entreprise, cet article étudie l'efficacité du contrôle exercé par la structure de propriété et le conseil d'administration sur les dirigeants. La confrontation des théories de l'enracinement et de l'agence permet de déterminer les conditions...

The typical French listed company exhibits a concentrated ownership structure with the largest shareholder typically holding more voting rights than cash flow rights. This paper studies the acquisitions made by French listed firms over the period 2000 through 2009 and investigates how such...

This paper analyzes the interactions between vertical integration and (wholesale) spot, forward and retail markets in risk management. We develop an equilibrium model that fits electricity markets well. We point out that vertical integration and forward hedging are two separate levers for demand...

We consider a setting in which two potential buyers, one with a prior toehold and one without, compete in a takeover modeled as an ascending auction with participating costs. The toeholder is more aggressive during the takeover process because she is also a seller of her own shares. The...

Nous étudions l'impact des participations au capital sur les enchères à valeurs privées indépendantes. Le revenu de l'enchère décroît lorsque les acheteurs ont des participations croisées et croît lorsqu'ils détiennent une partie du capital du vendeur. Dans tous les cas de...

This article is concerned with modeling the dynamic and distributional properties of daily spot and forward electricity prices across European wholesale markets. Prices for forward contracts are extracted from a unique database from a major energy trader in Europe. Spot and forward returns are...

We examine how ownership concentration and the separation of ownership and control affect market liquidity in France. We find that firms with a large insider blockholder exhibit significantly lower liquidity. Different methods of concentrating control affect liquidity in different ways. Pyramid...

In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. This paper investigates the effects of such agreements on the valuation of firms. I use a sample of French firms that is well suited for my analysis insofar as French law requires the disclosure...

In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. This paper investigates the effects of such agreements on the valuation of firms. I use a sample of French firms that is well suited for my analysis insofar as French law requires the disclosure...

In listed companies, some shareholders can be signatories to agreements that govern their relations. Such agreements are often viewed as means of insulating the firm from the market for corporate control. Specific provisions (namely concerted action, pre-emptive buying rights and repartitioning...