The object of this paper is to understand how the perception by Limenians of inequalities of opportunity is formed in Peru, based on qualitative interviews realized by the author. It aims to contribute to the normative debate on social justice ; as according to several authors, the perception of...

According to a minimalist version of Afriat’s theorem, a consumer behaves as a utility maximizer if and only if a feasibility matrix associated with his choices is cyclically consistent. An ”essential experiment” consists of observed consumption bundles (x1,xn) and a feasibility matrix α....

Cet article tente d’identifier empiriquement les déterminants de la croissance turque à partir de données annuelles de 1980 à 1995. L’analyse empirique s’appuie sur un modèle théorique "canonique" de croissance qui nous sert à élaborer des résultats empiriques. Il nous invite à...

We identify a natural counterpart of the standard GARP for demand data in which goods are all indivisible. We show that the new axiom (DARP, for "discrete axiom of revealed preference") is necessary and sufficient for the rationalization of the data by a well-behaved utility function. Our...

In many research papers the research methodology section gives details of the context and data gathering strategy however the data analysis process often remains a mystery. In an aim to increase collective reflection on data analysis, this article adds to emerging literature on the subject....

Most longitudinal surveys recontact households only if they are still living in the same dwelling, producing very high attrition rates, especially in developing countries where rural–urban migration is prevalent. In this paper, we discuss the implications of the various follow-up rules used in...

The paper addresses the issue of the accuracy of standard-of-living measurements using household survey data. First, it highlights the fact that lighter data collection processes in some developing countries have added to measurement errors in consumption and income aggregates measurement...

We are given a list of tasks Z and a population divided into several groups X j of equal size. Performing one task z requires constituting a team with exactly one member x j from every group. There is a cost (or reward) for participation: if type x j chooses task z, he receives p j (z);...