In this paper we show that unlike in Bayesian frameworks asymmetric information does matter and can explain differences in common knowledge decisions due to ambiguous character of agents' private information. Agents share a common-but-not-necessarily-additive prior beliefs represented by...

In this paper, we extend Aumann’s (Ann Stat 4:1236–1239, 1976) probabilistic agreement theorem to situations in which agents’ prior beliefs are represented by a common neo-additive capacity. In particular, we characterize the family of updating rules for neo-additive capacities, which are...

The theory of existence of equilibrium with short-selling is reconsidered under risk and ambiguity modelled by risk averse variational preferences. No-arbitrage conditions are given in terms of risk adjusted priors. A sufficient condition for existence of efficient allocations is the overlapping...

The theory of existence of equilibrium with short-selling is reconsidered under risk and ambiguity modelled by risk averse variational preferences. A sufficient condition for existence of efficient allocations is that the relative interiors of the risk adjusted sets of expectations overlap. This...

Questioning about game theory as an institutionalism theory could seem unsound at first glance. In game theory, the very basic concept of players’ strategies is quite individualistic and really independent on any social constraint and other institutional consideration. On another hand, the...

Toward the late 1990s, several research groups independently began developing new, related theories in mathematical finance. These theories did away with the standard stochastic geometric diffusion "Samuelson" market model (also known as the Black-Scholes model because it is used in that most...

The set of all Bayesian–Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by making conditional commitments at the interim stage of a Bayesian game coincides with the set of all feasible, incentive compatible and interim individually rational payoffs of the Bayesian game. Furthermore, the...

This paper examines a decentralized, dynamical, pure exchange economy in which changes in an individual consumers demand depend on his own consumption and on prices. An ‘instantaneous Walras law’ provides a sufficient condition for the existence of viable exchange trajectories. Such dynamic...

The cost of equity capital is traditionally considered as an increasing function of the estimation risk – the risk of error regarding the distribution of a firm’s future cash flows (FCF). Under international GAAPs, IAS 36 “Impairment of assets” -based information disclosure conveys...

Two agents sequentially contracts with different principals under moral hazard. If agents care for one another, the second principal gains by insuring them over first wages. Even with independent tasks, the first principal must offer riskier payments to induce effort.