A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
Year of publication: |
2013-03
|
---|---|
Authors: | Forges, Françoise |
Institutions: | Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) |
Subject: | Bayesian game | commitment | contract | incentive compatibility | interim individual rationality |
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