If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator...

The dual reduction process, introduced by Myerson, allows a finite game to be reduced to a smaller-dimensional game such that any correlated equilibrium of the reduced game is an equilibrium of the original game. We study the properties and applications of this process. It is shown that generic...

In this paper we present a new class of pedestrian crowd models based on the mean field games theory introduced by Lasry and Lions in 2006. This macroscopic approach is based on a microscopic model, that considers smart pedestrians who rationally interact and anticipate the future. This leads...

We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria. LetEbe an exchange economy with differential information. We associate a strategic market gameΓ(E) withE. We...

The average voting procedure reflects the weighted average of expressed opinions in [0,1]. Participants typically behave strategically. We evaluate the discrepancy between the average taste and the average vote. If the population is sufficiently large, it is possible to construct approximations...