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The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignement game

Forges, Françoise - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2004

We consider two-sided matching markets in which agents have private information on a state of nature which determines … the agents' utilities of matching. Monetary transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. The model thus … (interim) incentive compatible coarse core of the matching game are both non-empty. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905077

Honest signalling in trust interactions: smiles rated as genuine induce trust and signal higher earnings opportunities

Centorrino, Samuele; Djemaï, Elodie; Hopfensitz, Astrid; … - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2015

We test the hypothesis that smiles perceived as honest serve as a signal that has evolved to induce cooperation in situations requiring mutual trust. Potential trustees (84 participants from Toulouse, France) made two video clips averaging around 15 seconds for viewing by potential senders...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011115220

Matching for Teams

Carlier, Guillaume; Ekeland, Ivar - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2010

We are given a list of tasks Z and a population divided into several groups X j of equal size. Performing one task z requires constituting a team with exactly one member x j from every group. There is a cost (or reward) for participation: if type x j chooses task z, he receives p j (z);...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706644

Transfer Rate Rules and Core Selections in NTU Games

Iehlé, Vincent - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2004

Different kinds of asymmetries between players can occur in core allocations, in that case the stability of the concept is questioned. One remedy consists in selecting robust core allocations. We review, in this note, results that all select core allocations in NTU games with different concepts...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905124

Sustainability in a Multiproduct and Multiple Agent Contestable Market

Iehlé, Vincent - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2009

We prove that a natural monopoly can set subsidy free pricing and sustainable pricing schedules in general economic environment. The setting is a multiproduct and multiple agent contestable market where demands are elastic and where rivals can enter the sub-markets composed by a set of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905176

Tarifications stables dans les monopoles multiproduits avec marchés séparés

Iehlé, Vincent - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2004

We provide some existence results of stable pricings for natural monopoly as defined in the theory of contestable markets. The main addings are based on the assumption of separated markets and the possibilities of entries. We borrow tools from cooperative game theory. Following the work of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905237

Stable pricing in monopoly and equilibrium-core of cost games.

Iehlé, Vincent - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2004

We prove the existence of subsidy free and sustainable pricing schedule in multiproduct contestable markets. We allow firms to discriminate the local markets that are composed by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Results are obtained under an assumption of fair sharing cost and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905384

Payoff-dependant Balancedness and Cores

Bonnisseau, Jean-Marc; Iehlé, Vincent - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2007

We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff vectors satisfying this condition. The additional...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010905386

The lattice structure of the S-Lorenz core

Iehlé, Vincent - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2015

For any TU game and any ranking of players, the set of all preimputations compatible with the ranking, equipped with the Lorenz order, is a bounded join semi-lattice. Furthermore, the set admits as sublattice the S-Lorenz core intersected with the region compatible with the ranking. This result...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011228181

Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory

Moulin, Hervé; Peleg, B. - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 1982

In a committee where cooperative voting occurs, effectivity functions describe the blocking power of coalitions. It is a binary relation that says for each coalition T and each subset of outcomes B whether or not T can force the final outcome within B. The corresponding cooperative stability...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765456