The private long-term care insurance (LTCI) market is a puzzle, in France and in several developed countries (United-States, Spain, etc. . . ). The long-term care insurance market is small, yet long-term care is one of the largest uninsured financial risks facing the elderly. In addition public...

In this paper, we want to characterize the optimal health insurance contract with adverse selection and moral hazard. We assume that policyholders differ by the permanent health status loss and choose an unobservable preventive effort in order to reduce the probability of illness which is...

This paper investigates the impact of health risk on insurance contract with hazard moral. We use a bi-dimensional utility function (wealth and health status). We prove that the type of health risk influences the equilibrium of insurance market. A full coverage is possible with moral hazard....

A partir d’une étude de l’offre de contrats d’assurance dépendance en France, on analysera les principales caractéristiques des contrats proposés (qu’ils soient individuels ou collectifs, facultatifs ou obligatoires). Les termes des contrats seront définis (niveau de dépendance...

De nombreux arguments théoriques ont été mis en avant pour expliquer les décisions de souscrire ou non à de l'assurance dépendance. Quelques études empiriques ont étudié ces phénomènes sur le marché américain mais très peu de travaux ont été effectués sur le marché français de...

While the insurance demand is very well documented in other countries, French research in this area is scarce, mainly because of the difficulty to have access to detailed data. This PhD uses data provided by a major health insurance company. We first build a joint modelling for both insurance...

According to economic theory, health insurance raises medical care consumptions by inducing ex-post moral hazard behavior, it is to say the purchase of health care that individual value below their production cost. Nevertheless, among the economists community, some suggest that these additional...

This article examines the impact of varying mandatory pensions on saving, life insurance, and annuity markets in an adverse selection economy. Under reasonable restrictions, we find unambiguous effects on market size, participation rates, and equilibrium prices. The degree of adverse selection,...

We analyze markets where insurers are better informed about risk than consumers. We show that even competitive markets may result in insufficient information revelation and inefficient insurance coverage. This explains why certain risky consumers remain uninsured and why certain market segments...