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External referencing and pharmaceutical price negociation
Garcia Marinoso, Begona; Jelovac, Izabella; Olivella, Pau - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2011
External referencing (ER) imposes a price cap for pharmaceuticals, based on prices of identical or comparable products …-containment policy. Namely, in Europe, drug authorization and price negotiations are carried out by separate agencies. We confirm our … main results in two extensions. The first one allows for therapeutic competition between drugs. In the second one, drug …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707663
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Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion
Aubert, Cécile; Pouyet, Jérôme - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2006
Regulators often do not regulate all firms competing in a given sector. Due to product substitutability, unregulated competitors have incentives to bribe regulated firms to have them overstate their costs and produce less, thereby softening competition. The best collusion-proof contract entails...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010795034
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Internet Governance: Old Issues, New Framings, Uncertain Implications
Brousseau, Eric; Marzouki, Meryem - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2012
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765453
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How to design institutional frameworks for markets: New institutional economics meet the needs of industrial organization
Brousseau, Eric; Nicita, Antonio - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2010
The key role of institutions for economic performance has recently been acknowledged in the economic policy debate. This paper aims at pointing out the main policy lessons and the recommendations to be drawn from New Institutional Economics (NIE), when considering the organization of markets. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765457
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'Reflexive' Market Regulation: Cognitive Cooperation in Competitive Information Fora
Brousseau, Eric; Glachant, Jean-Michel - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010765459
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New institutional economics: a guidebook
Brousseau, Eric; Glachant, Jean-Michel - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2008
Twenty-one papers explore the accomplishments, limitations, and unmet needs of the field of new institutional economics. Papers discuss the theories of the firm; contracts--from bilateral sets of incentives to the multilevel governance of relations; institutions and the institutional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010723174
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Regulators as Reflexive Governance Platforms
Brousseau, Eric; Glachant, Jean-Michel - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2011
Network industries are now characterized by a regime of permanent innovation, while they continue to be fixed and sunk cost industries, due to the high level of investments in R&D and infrastructures. Players in these industries need to coordinate their investments; hence a threat of collusion....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010723175
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Décisions d’investissement et de démantèlement sous incertitude : une application au secteur électrique
Chaton, Corinne - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2001
The purpose of this study is to use real options theory to answer the following question: Is it necessary, in France, to invest in new nuclear power units or should some of the existing units be decommissioned? The theoretical model developed establishes two price thresholds which determine...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706628
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Remanufacturing
Bernard, Sophie - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2011
This paper presents a theoretical model of remanufacturing where a duopoly of original manufacturers produces a component of a final good. The specific component that needs to be replaced during the lifetime of the final good creates a secondary market where independent remanufacturers enter the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706723
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Partial Yardstick Regulation and Collusion
Aubert, Cécile; Pouyet, Jérome - Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX) - 2006
Entrants may provide information to a regulator, even when they cannot be regulated. With correlated costs, yardstick-like regulatory contracts based on the output of unregulated firms nullify information rents. But they give strong incentives to the regulated incumbent to bribe competitors. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010706822