This paper describes a method for solving a class of forward-looking Markov-switching Rational Expectations models under noisy measurement, by specifying the unobservable expectations component as a general-measurable function of the observable states of the system, to be determined optimally...

In our model, individual consumers follow simple behavioral decision rules based on imitation and habit as suggested in consumer research, social learning, and related fields. Demand can be viewed as the outcome of a population game whose revision protocol is determined by the consumers'...

We analyze the strategic behavior of firms when demand is determined by a rule of thumb behavior of consumers. We assume consumer dynamics where individual consumers follow simple behavioral decision rules governed by imitation and habit as suggested in consumer research. On this basis, we...

Tuning one's shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect information. The temperature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem possibly unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions, identical...

The theory of melioration, originally formulated for individual decision-making contexts, is formally extended to a game theoretic framework. This paper proves the existence of a distribution that is a melioration strategy on the part of all players. Further, the question of stability of such a...

In the standard CAPM with a riskless asset we prove existence of equilibria without assuming concavity of the investor's utility functions. Moreover, we give a uniqueness result using assumptions on the risk aversion of investors.

We demonstrate that in a CAPM economy Walras Law and the Tobin Separation Property characterize market demand in finite sets of prices. Consequently, for any number n there exist CAPM economies which have at least n equilibria and hence have n different beta pricing fomulas. It is shown that the...

In this study we consider a linear model with forecast feedback in which boundedly rational agents are learning the parameter values of the rational expectations equilibrium by the OLS learning procedure. We show strong consistency of the OLS estimates under much weaker assumptions on the...