We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. A security agency operates a network with arc capacities. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow that specifies a plan for carrying bads through the network from a base to a...

This paper brings together two of the most important solution concepts of game theory �subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game and the core of a cooperativegame. Our approach rests on two fundamental ideas: (1) Given an extensive game, the formationof a coalition leads to...

This paper shows how distance may be used to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which trade agreements are regional. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance between countries a familiar problem of coordination failure occurs,...

Kalai (2002) demonstrates that in semi anonymous Bayesian games with sufficiently many players any Bayesian equilibrium is approximately ex-post Nash. In this paper we demonstrate that the existence of an approximate expost Nash property implies a purification result of the standard sort for the...

In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to the behavior of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such behavior can be consistent with self-interest. We propose that this consistency...

We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, variation in the extent to which firms can use public goods to reduce costs brings about a reduction in the intensity of tax competition. This in turn brings about a loss of efficiency. In this environment, a `minimum tax'...

This paper measures the housing market impact of state-level anti-discrimination laws in the 1960s using household-level and census-tract data. State-level "fair-housing" laws attempted to bar discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin in the sale, rental, and financing...

We consider a two-player strategic bargaining model with discounting in which (i) the interim disagreement point in each period is stochastically determined at the beginning of the period, and (ii) the proposing player can delay in making an offer. Unlike many other bargaining models of complete...

This paper argues that, because governments are able to relax tax competition through public good differentiation, traditionally high-tax countries have continued to set taxes at a relatively high rate even as markets have become more integrated. The key assumption is that there is variation in...

Given the preferences of players and the rules governing network formation, what networks are likely to emerge and persist? And how do individuals and coalitions evaluate possible consequences of their actions in forming networks? To address these questions we introduce a model of network...