The paper attempts to examine the nature and the extent of strategic entries of independent candidates in elections following FPTP rule. The paper observes that besides individual incentives of the candidates, a major factor behind the emergence of independents under FPTP systems could be the...

In this paper we present a two stage game of political lobbying for policies designed to enhance environmental quality. Unlike previous work which has tended to assume perfect monitoring of environmental quality in lobbying games we allow for imperfect monitoring of environmental quality. We...

Democracy resolves conflicts in difficult games like Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken by stabilizing their cooperative outcomes. It does so by transforming these games into games in which voters are presented with a choice between a cooperative outcome and a Pareto-inferior noncooperative...

Policymakers in modern and open economies face a macroeconomic trilemma (Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor 2005). There are three main sought-after objectives: 1. to stabilize the exchange rate; 2. to enjoy free international capital mobility 3. to engage in a monetary policy oriented toward...