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Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games
Martimort, David; Stole, Lars - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
We study games of public delegated common agency under asymmetric information. Us- ing tools from non-smooth analysis and optimal control, we derive best responses and characterize equilibria (both continuous and discontinuous) using self-generating opti- mization programs of which any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009251555
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Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
Schmitz, Patrick W. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013
An agent can make an observable but non-contractible investment. A principal then offers to collaborate with the agent to provide a public good. Private information of the agent about his valuation may either decrease or increase his investment incentives, depending on whether he learns his type...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111541
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The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents
Behringer, Stefan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
This paper provides a limit result for the provision of a public good in a mechanism design framework as the number of agents gets large. What distinguishes the public good investigated in this analysis is its direct provision technology which is commonplace in modern information technologies.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789399
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Money Talks? An Experimental Study of Rebate in Reputation System Design
Li, Lingfang; Xiao, Erte - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
Reputation systems that rely on feedback from traders are important institutions for helping sustain trust in markets, while feedback information is usually considered a public good. We apply both theoretical models and experiments to study how raters' feedback behavior responds to different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008560983
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Power of Joint Decision-Making in a Finitely-Repeated Dilemma
Kamei, Kenju - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2015
A rich body of literature has proposed that pairs behave significantly differently from individuals due to a number of reasons such as group polarization. This paper experimentally compares cooperation behaviors between pairs and individuals in a finitely-repeated two-player public goods game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011191512
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Obedience to Rules with Mild Sanctions: The Roles of Peer Punishment and Voting
Chen, Josie I - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
study the impact of non-deterrent formal sanctions on voluntary contributions to a public good in a laboratory experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107459
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Promoting Competition or Helping Less-Endowed? An Experiment on Collective Institutional Choices under Intra-Group Inequality
Kamei, Kenju - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
good is selected. The majority of subjects, however, vote in favor of having a public good, contrary to the standard theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113335
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How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games
Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
Democracy resolves conflicts in difficult games like Prisoners’ Dilemma and Chicken by stabilizing their cooperative outcomes. It does so by transforming these games into games in which voters are presented with a choice between a cooperative outcome and a Pareto-inferior noncooperative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835685
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Cursed beliefs with common-value public goods
Cox, Caleb - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
, despite the absence of free-riding incentives. In a laboratory experiment, subjects indeed under-contribute relative to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109699
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Why is the Workplace Racially Segregated by Occupation?
Naqvi, Nadeem - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
by economic theory, but “the hypothesis of employer discrimination does not at all explain segregation by occupation … theory foundations, insofar as they impose a utility indicator function as a primitive concept via persuasion, rather than … to discriminate. Economic theory is, therefore, endogenously color-blind, race-blind, gender-blind, ethnicity-blind, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011260187