Showing 1 - 10 of 137
: (a) equivalence of the core and the set of competitive outcomes; (b) the Shapley value is contained in the core or … approximate cores; (c) the equal treatment property holds -- that is, both market equilibrium and the core treat similar players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009328147
direct assumption that preferences have maximal elements on a fixed agenda. We show that the core of a simple game is … number of the game. The same is true if we replace the core by the core without majority dissatisfaction, obtained by … deleting from the agenda all the alternatives that are non-maximal for all players in a winning coalition. Unlike the core, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005837444
Twelve sets, proposed as social choice solution concepts, are compared: the core, five versions of the uncovered set …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259698
neither arbitrarily small coalitions nor large coalitions are enough to block an allocation which is not in the core, due to … the core provided by Vind and Schmeidler (1972) to economies with asymmetrically informed traders. We then focus on … finest information. Finally, characterizations for the weak fine, the fine and the private core are obtained as particular …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004814
question of core stability of the grand coalition, namely: is there a subset of bidders that prefers forming a small bidding … the grand coalition is not necessarily core stable, as opposed to the zero externality case, where the stability of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009211237
accept/reject certain proposals. The set of equilibrium outcomes is identified as the core if F's opponents can pre …-commit and as the convex hull of the core if they cannot pre-commit credibly. This extended model eliminates two flaws of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008642697
For any transferable utility game in coalitional form with nonempty core, we show that that the number of blocks … required to switch from an imputation out of the core to an imputation in the core is less than or equal to n(n-1)/2, where n …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008694029
This paper proposes two generalization of the core and evaluates them on experimental data of assignment games (workers …-cooperative games, and they prove to be both descriptive and predictive in the assignment games analyzed here. The "logit core" allows …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009251543
We define a bargaining set for finite economies using Aubin’s veto mechanism and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations. Then, we rewrite our notion in terms of replicated economies showing that, in contrast with Anderson, Trockel and Zhou’s (1997) non-convergence result,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011183541
We analyze bargaining mechanisms for allocating resources in atomless econo- mies. We provide results proving that it is not necessary to consider the forma- tion of all coalitions in order to obtain the bargaining sets. This is shown under restrictions of different nature, triggering different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107345