Showing 1 - 10 of 251
neither arbitrarily small coalitions nor large coalitions are enough to block an allocation which is not in the core, due to … the core provided by Vind and Schmeidler (1972) to economies with asymmetrically informed traders. We then focus on … information sharing rules based on the coalitions' size. Assuming the existence of coalitions to which the sharing rule associates …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004814
We define a bargaining set for finite economies using Aubin’s veto mechanism and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations. Then, we rewrite our notion in terms of replicated economies showing that, in contrast with Anderson, Trockel and Zhou’s (1997) non-convergence result,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011183541
is not necessary to consider the forma- tion of all coalitions in order to obtain the bargaining sets. This is shown …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107345
also shown that when an economy contains only negligible agents a Vind's type theorem on the private core with the exact …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009403445
In this paper we consider a pure exchange economy with a finite set of types of agents which have incomplete and asymmetric information on the states of nature. Our aim is to describe the equilibrium price formation and how the lack of information may affect the allocation of resources. For it,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005052179
social conventions by embedding a static bargaining setting in a dynamic process; Over time agents revise their coalitions … a logit specification of choice probabilities, we find that the stability of a core allocation decreases in the wealth … of the richest player, and that stochastically stable allocations are core allocations which minimize the wealth of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111822
information. One of them is the core and the other is known as coalitional fairness. The set of agents is modelled by a mixed … same agent can have common, private or pooled information when she becomes member of different coalitions. It is shown that … of small agents. We also focus on the information mechanism based on size of coalitions introduced in [18] and obtain a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109801
direct assumption that preferences have maximal elements on a fixed agenda. We show that the core of a simple game is … number of the game. The same is true if we replace the core by the core without majority dissatisfaction, obtained by … deleting from the agenda all the alternatives that are non-maximal for all players in a winning coalition. Unlike the core, the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005837444
Twelve sets, proposed as social choice solution concepts, are compared: the core, five versions of the uncovered set …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259698
question of core stability of the grand coalition, namely: is there a subset of bidders that prefers forming a small bidding … the grand coalition is not necessarily core stable, as opposed to the zero externality case, where the stability of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009211237