The modern literature on city formation and development, for example the New Economic Geography literature, has studied the agglomeration of agents in size or mass. We investigate agglomeration in sorting or by type of worker, that implies agglomeration in size when worker populations differ by...

This paper will describe and analyse the development of Basel II Capital Accord and will focus on the use of external ratings in the Standardized Approach in Basel II. Furthermore it will examine the problem of adverse selection which appears in Basel II as a result from the proposal for the use...

The modern literature on city formation and development, for example the New Economic Geography literature, has studied the agglomeration of agents in size or mass. We investigate agglomeration in sorting or by type of worker, that implies agglomeration in size when worker populations differ by...

Abstract In this paper, we review and explore the strategic mechanisms that deter entry in banking. The literature relies on externality between banks to generate entry deterrence. Typically, the externality generated is caused by differential adverse selection faced by incumbents and entrants....

This paper examines health insurance choice and its dynamics using panel data from Chile’s National Socio Economic Characterization Survey 1996-2001-2006. Evidence indicates that private insurance is losing customers to the public sector. Two different logistic models are used to explain the...

Asymmetric information is a relevant concept for studying and understanding financial markets. In this paper we discus the effect of asymmetric information on the borrower–lender relationship. The presence of asymmetric information in financial markets leads to adverse selection, moral hazard,...

We analyze the optimal regulation of a MFI that has private information on the intrinsic quality of its loan portfolio (adverse selection) and where the MFI’s choice of effort to improve this quality cannot be observed by the regulator (moral hazard). In designing optimal contracts the...

The paper investigates the problem of possibility of investment allocation by economies according to adverse pattern, which can ultimately imply the rise of situation of market failure. We consider the transformation of “ideal” capital allocation into allocation of adverse-selection-type,...

Agglomeration can be caused by asymmetric information and a locational signaling effect: The location choice of workers signals their productivity to potential employers. The cost of a signal is the cost of housing at a location. When workers' marginal utility of housing is negatively correlated...

We present a model in which banks trade toxic assets to fund investments. Adverse selection in toxic assets reduces liquidity and investment. Investment is inefficiently low because banks must sell high-quality assets below their "fair" value. We consider whether equity injections and asset...