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Parties in a bargaining situation may perceive guilt, a utility loss caused by receiving the larger share that is … problem for self-interested bargainers to a game with equally patient bargainers that exhibit a similar degree of guilt. The … bargaining parties still reach agreement in the first period. If guilt is strong, they split the bargaining surplus equally. In …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108407
being worse off and guilt if being better off, but they still reach agreement in the first period under complete information …. If the perceived guilt is strong, then the inequality-averse bargainers split the bargaining surplus equally regardless … of their degree of envy. If guilt is weak, then the agreed split is tilted away from the Rubinstein division towards a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108663
For contemporary legal theory, law is essentially an interpretative and hermeneutic practice (Ackerman (1991), Horwitz (1992)). A straightforward consequence is that legal disputes between parties are motivated by their divergent interpretations regarding what law says on their case. This point...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005837401
The paper addresses the issue of the impact of asymmetric information on risk aversion of litigant parties in a model à la Bebchuk. First we study the case where the plaintif is the informed party, and characterize the equilibrium with and without a pretrial negociation round. Then, we focuse...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789358
-serving biases concerning their fairness judgements. Moreover, psychological literature suggests that this can be a driving force of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649771
' beliefs about fairness and lower out-of-court settlement amounts. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005623433
). The proposer may be altruistic towards the responder either out of a genuine desire to make her happy or out of guilt. The … responder derives disutility from apparent acts of altruism motivated by guilt because she considers them to be insincere. She …’s prosocial behavior. I consider two recent formulations of endogenous guilt: simple guilt and guilt from blame. These …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835512
According to several psychological and economic studies, non-binding communication can be an effective tool to increase trust and enhance cooperation. This paper focuses on reasons why people stick to a given promise and analyzes to what extent image concerns of being perceived as a promise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106295
depending on whether preferences exhibit desert elation or desert guilt. Our notion of desert generalizes distributional concern … guilt generates a continuum of symmetric equilibria. Equilibrium effort can lie above or below the level in the absence of … desert, so desert guilt generates behavior consistent with both positive and negative reciprocity and may underpin social …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009650671
The following is a model of psychological contracting with unmonitorable performance, implicit offers, and screening … for non-performance by the announcement of the expectation of performance. It is motivated by the $250 billion … asymmetric information. I show that the `shame' of accepting a possible bribe can screen for reciprocation inducing `guilt'. An …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109577