The paper extends the Nash equilibrium concept to account for arbitrary behavioral heuristics. Players are allowed not only to choose strategies, but also to select behavioral rules how to choose strategies. It is argued that behavioral profiles are in equilibrium if no player can benefit from...

The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. We provide an axiomatization of two parametric families of CSF’s. In the first, the winning probability of each agent depends on the investments and a vector of...

Bounded rationality questions backward induction, which however, does not exclude such reasoning when anticipation is easy. In our stochastic (alternating offer) bargaining experiment, there is a certain first-period pie and a known finite deadline. What is uncertain (except for the final...

We analyse pricing, effort and tipping decisions in the online service "Google Answers" While users set a price for the answer to their question ex ante, they can additionally give a tip to the researcher ex post. In line with the related experimental literature we find evidence that tipping is...

The paper analyses the payment behaviour of customers of the online music label Magnatune. Customers may pay what they want for albums, as long as the payment is within a given price range ($5-$18). Magnatune’s comprehensive pre-purchase access facilitates music discovery and allows an...

The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume that contestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes these axiomatizations to the case where each...

Does geographic or (perceived) social distance between subjects signi?cantly affect proposer and responder behavior in ultimatum bargaining? To answer this question, subjects once play an ultimatum game with three players (proposer, responder, and dummy player) and asymmetric information (only...

In a two-person ï¬nitely repeated public goods experiment, we use intentions data to interpret individual behavior. Based on a random-utility model speciï¬cation, we develop a relationship between a player's beliefs about others' behavior and his contributions' plans, and use this...

Es besteht empirische Evidenz, dass reale Spieler weitaus mehr Vertrauen und Vertrauenswürdigkeit entwickeln als es nach den Voraussagen der klassischen Spieltheorie rational ist. Das Papier skizziert den Indirekt Evolutionären Ansatz zur Erklärung der Entstehung von Vertrauen nach Güth und...

Zusammenfassung: Es gibt eine wachsende Literatur zur "verhaltensorientierten" bzw. "psychologischen" Spieltheorie. Die meisten dieser Ansätze beziehen verschiedene Vorstellungen von Fairness, Ungleichheitsaversion oder andere intrinsische Motive in die Nutzenfunktion ein, um empirisch...