We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms, which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration,...

In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing efficiency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many-on-one)...

This paper shows that the price of a painting sold at an art auction and the experts' pre-sale valuations are anchored on the price at which the painting previously sold at auction. We are able to separate anchoring from rational learning by using the identifying strategy that the unobservable...

The paper reports the architecture of a continuous combinatorial auction. Preferences are based on sets of items and feasibility requires the nonintersection of sets. Countdown clocks replace eligibility and activity requirements typical of rounds-based auctions. Bids remain in the system to be...

Procurement contracts are often renegotiated because of changes that are required after their execution. Using highway paving contracts we show that renegotiation imposes significant adaptation costs. Reduced form regressions suggest that bidders respond strategically to contractual...

We study the impact of a public school choice lottery in Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools on college enrollment and degree completion. We find a significant overall increase in college attainment among lottery winners who attend their first choice school. Using rich administrative data on peers,...

We describe two auction forms for search engine advertising and present two simple theoretical results concerning i) the estimation of click-through rates and ii) how to adjust the auctions for broad match search. We also describe some of the practical issues involved in implementing a VCG auction.

We study a uniform-price auction where k identical common-value objects are allocated amongst z k bidders who have imperfect signals about the state of the world. The common valuation is determined jointly by the state and an action that is chosen after winning an object. In large auctions,...

A principal delegates multiple decisions to an agent, who has private information relevant to each decision. The principal is uncertain about the agent's preferences. I solve for max-min optimal mechanisms? those which maximize the principal's payoff against the worst case agent preference...