Showing 1 - 10 of 181
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584524
We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms, which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013502140
In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing efficiency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many-on-one)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010949121
Procurement contracts are often renegotiated because of changes that are required after their execution. Using highway paving contracts we show that renegotiation imposes significant adaptation costs. Reduced form regressions suggest that bidders respond strategically to contractual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010815559
We study a uniform-price auction where k identical common-value objects are allocated amongst z k bidders who have imperfect signals about the state of the world. The common valuation is determined jointly by the state and an action that is chosen after winning an object. In large auctions,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010815632
We study a contest with multiple, nonidentical prizes. Participants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) affecting their costs of effort. The contestant with the highest effort wins the first prize, the contestant with the second-highest effort wins the second prize, and so on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005821060
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584519
Several impatient investors with private costs <em>C<sub>i</sub></em> face an indivisible irreversible investment opportunity whose value <em>V</em> is governed by geometric Brownian motion. The first investor <em>i</em> to seize the opportunity receives the entire payoff, <em>V-C<sub>i</sub></em>. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008645031
Market outcomes depend on the quality of information available to its participants. We measure the effect of information disclosure on market outcomes using a large-scale field experiment that randomly discloses quality information in wholesale automobile auctions. We argue that buyers in this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011156805
The tension between allocative efficiency and information aggregation is explored in the context of an auction: k identical objects of unknown quality are auctioned off to n bidders whose tastes affect their valuation of an object of given quality. Bidders receive a signal about the quality of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572970