[EN] This paper analyzes the timing of wage bargaining in a unionized market, assuming that workers are organized in independent unions. In equilibrium, when unions decide the timing of the negotiations, we obtain a staggered wage setting. When firms decide the timing of the negotiations, we...

Also published as Working Paper Ikerlanak 2003-08

The literature on mixed oligopoly does not consider that there is strategic interaction between governments when they decide whether to privatize their public firms. In order to analyze this quetion we consider two countries; In each country there is one public firm and n private firms. Firms...

The purpose of this paper is to study how the choice of environmental standards by governments is affected by the existence of wage incomes when firms' location is endogenous. In developed countries labor is unionized, which allows positive wage incomes to arise. Thus, each government has...

The literature on mixed oligopoly does not consider the role that the environmental policy of the government plays on the decision whether to privatize public firms. Assuming that there are one public firm and n private firms and that the government chooses an environmental standard we show...

[EN] We analyse in this paper whether it should be the government of each country that decides whether to privatise a publicly-owned firm (non integration) or whether a supra-national authority should decide whether publicly-owned companies in the different countries should be privatised...

The literature on mergers has extensively analyzed the decision to merge by private firms but it has not considered the decision to merge by private and public firms. We assume that when a private firm and a public firm merge (or when one of them acquires the other), they sets up a multiproduct...

This paper analyzes whether owners of firms have incentives to delegate their long-run decisions to managers or not. The result arising from our analysis shows that owners do have incentives to keep their long-run decisions (the location of the firm) to themselves. In this context we show that...