We consider 2-bidder first-price auctions where one bidder's value is commonly known. Such auctions induce an … ineffcient allocation. We show that a resale opportunity, where the auction winner can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the …). Resale always reduces all bidders' payoffs and increases the initial seller's revenue. …

In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator - a … bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. For second-price and English auctions the efficient … makes positive profits. First-price and Dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium, and whether or not the …

The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by …

We consider 2-bidder first-price auctions where one bidder's value is commonly known. Such auctions induce an … ineffcient allocation. We show that a resale opportunity, where the auction winner can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the …). Resale always reduces all bidders' payoffs and increases the initial seller's revenue. …

In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator - a … bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. For second-price and English auctions the efficient … makes positive profits. First-price and Dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium, and whether or not the …

The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by …

It is commonly assumed in private value auctions that bidders have no information about the realization of the other …