Showing 1 - 10 of 121
In a sequencing problem with linear time cost, Suijs (1996) proved that it is possible to achieve first best. By first best we mean that one can find mechanisms that satisfy efficiency of decision, dominant strategy incentive compatibility and budget balancedness. In this paper we show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317633
In this paper we analyze sequencing situations under incomplete information where agents have interdependent costs. We first argue why Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (or VCG) mechanism fails to implement a simple sequencing problem in dominant strategies. Given this impossibility, we try to implement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317646
In mechanism design problems under incomplete information, it is generally difficult to find decision problems that are first best implementable. A decision problem under incomplete information is first best implementable if there exists a mechanism that extracts the private information and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317674
In a sequencing problem with linear time cost, Suijs (1996) proved that it is possible to achieve first best. By first best we mean that one can find mechanisms that satisfy efficiency of decision, dominant strategy incentive compatibility and budget balancedness. In this paper we show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004989617
In this paper we analyze sequencing situations under incomplete information where agents have interdependent costs. We first argue why Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (or VCG) mechanism fails to implement a simple sequencing problem in dominant strategies. Given this impossibility, we try to implement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968380
In mechanism design problems under incomplete information, it is generally difficult to find decision problems that are first best implementable. A decision problem under incomplete information is first best implementable if there exists a mechanism that extracts the private information and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001503
We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identity-dependent externalities. A concept of conjectural equilibrium is proposed, and the universal conjecture is shown to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the general existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332666
When using the strategy method in ultimatum bargaining, many researchers ask responders for the minimal acceptable offer only implicitly assuming strategies to be monotone. Recent research has shown, however, that subjects decline disadvantageous and advantageous proposals. We report on an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263118
In the recent experimental literature several social preference models have been suggested that address observed behavior not reducible to the pursuit of self-interest. Inequality aversion is one such model where preferences are distributional. Frequently, envy is suggested as the underlying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263123
Steady state equilibria in heterogeneous agent matching models with search frictions have been shown to exist in Shimer and Smith (2000) under the assumption of a quadratic search technology. We extend their analysis to the commonly investigated linear search technology.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270012