Bargaining with Many Players: A Limit Result

We provide a simple characterization of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium of an alternating offers bargaining game when the number of players increases without a limit. Core convergence literature is emulated by increasing the number of players by replication. The limit allocation is interpreted in terms of Walrasian market for being the first proposer.

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Year of publication:	2008-06
Authors:	Kultti, Klaus ; Vartiainen, Hannu
Institutions:	Turun Kauppakorkeakoulu, Turun Yliopisto
Subject:	non-cooperative bargaining \| stationary equilibrium \| replication \| Walrasian market

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers. - ISSN 1796-3133.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 32 1 pages long
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005537227