Showing 1 - 10 of 23
In the context of standard two-period pure-exchange economies with sequential trade, this paper proposes a decentralized coordination mechanism for equilibriumexpectations, facilitated by local interactions between agents. Interactions are modelled stochastically by specifying a family of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263152
In the context of standard two-period pure-exchange economies with sequential trade, this paper proposes a decentralized coordination mechanism for equilibriumexpectations, facilitated by local interactions between agents. Interactions are modelled stochastically by specifying a family of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968361
The paper analyzes how the choice of organizational structure leads to the best compromise between controlling behavior based on authority rights and minimizing costs for implementing high efforts. Concentrated delegation and hierarchical delegation turn out to be never an optimal compromise. If...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312979
We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that if the agent faces limited liability and there is an incentive problem the principal prefers not to impose such a clause if and only if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263163
We consider a bilateral trade setting with costless renegotiation and investment by both the buyer and the seller. Whether first best levels of relationship-specific investment can be induced by a simple contract depends on available breach remedies. As demonstrated by Edlin and Reichelstein...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263181
We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any verifi- able performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264908
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empiri- cal puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264917
Several empirical studies have challenged tournament theory by pointing out that (1) there is considerable pay variation within hierarchy levels, (2) promotion premiums only in part explain hierarchical wage differences and (3) external recruitment is observable on nearly any hierarchy level. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264925
It is well-known that, in static models, minimum wages generate positive worker rents and, consequently, ine?ciently low effort. We show that this result does not necessarily extend to a dynamic context. The reason is that, in repeated employment relationships, ?rms may exploit workers’ future...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270019
We identify a new problem that may arise when heterogeneous workers are motivated by relative performance schemes: If workers’ abilities and the production technology are complements, the firm may prefer not to adopt a more advanced technology even though this technology would costlessly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010271450