Showing 1 - 10 of 109
By enriching a principal-agent model it is shown that the introduction of monetary incentives may reduce an agent … convictions of others, high powered incentives signal that not sticking to agreements is a widespread behavior and may lead to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263084
By enriching a principal-agent model it is shown that the introduction of monetary incentives may reduce an agent … convictions of others, high powered incentives signal that not sticking to agreements is a widespread behavior and may lead to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968398
In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modeled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263110
The importance of fair and equal treatment of workers is at the heart of the debate in organizational management. In this regard, we study how reward mechanisms and production technologies affect effort provision in teams. Our experimental results demonstrate that unequal rewards can potentially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274004
The importance of fair and equal treatment of workers is at the heart of the debate in organizational management. In this regard, we study how reward mechanisms and production technologies affect effort provision in teams. Our experimental results demonstrate that unequal rewards can potentially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968354
In the economic literature on market competition, firms are often modeled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the firm is neglected (unitary player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one can not generally expect that the behavior of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968365
problem to design a contract that provides an expert with incentives to acquire and reveal information. We show that it is in … provision of incentives when the realized state is not verifiable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263103
It is often claimed that (i) managers work too hard on operational issues and do not spend enough effort on strategic activities and (ii) something can be done about this by introducing nonfinancial performance measures as for instance with a balanced scorecard. We give an explanation for both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317664
It is often claimed that (i) managers work too hard on operational issues and do not spend enough effort on strategic activities and (ii) something can be done about this by introducing nonfinancial performance measures as for instance with a balanced scorecard. We give an explanation for both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968331
problem to design a contract that provides an expert with incentives to acquire and reveal information. We show that it is in … provision of incentives when the realized state is not verifiable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001487