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We analyze the effects of lower bounds on wages, e.g., minimum wages or liability limits, on job design within firms. In our model, two tasks contribute to non-veriable firm value and affect an imperfect performance measure. The tasks can be assigned to either one or two agents. In the absence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009125582
In practice, two types of tournaments can be distinguished - U-type and J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments, workers receive prizes that have been fixed in advance. In J-type tournaments, the employer fixes an aggregate wage bill in advance, which is then shared among the workers according...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538870
This paper extends the standard principal-agent model with moral hazard to allow for agents having reference-dependent preferences according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The main finding is that loss aversion leads to fairly simple contracts. In particular, when shifting the focus from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782366
It is often claimed that (i) managers work too hard on operational issues and do not spend enough effort on strategic activities and (ii) something can be done about this by introducing nonfinancial performance measures as for instance with a balanced scorecard. We give an explanation for both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539694
In an asymmetric tournament model with endogenous risk choice by the agents it is shown that equilibrium efforts decrease (increase) with risk if abilities are sufficiently similar (different). Risk also affects winning probabilities. The interaction of both effects is analyzed.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011540069
This paper considers the interplay of job assignments with the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of an agent. Job assignments influence the self confidence of the agent, and thereby his intrinsic motivation. Monetary reward allow the principal to complement intrinsic motivation with extrinsic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782278
In innovation contests, the progress of the competing firms in the innovation process is usually their private … information. We analyze an innovation contest in which research firms have a stochastic technology to develop innovations at a …. Additionally, we show that firms may voluntarily reveal their information. -- Contest ; innovation ; information revelation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008986738