We investigate combinatorial auctions from a practical perspective. The auctioneer gathers information according to a dynamical protocol termed ask price procedure. We demonstrate a method for elucidating whether a procedure gathers sufficient information for deriving a VCG mechanism. We...

We investigate multiunit exchange where a central planner and participants both bring commodities to sell and the central planner plays the role of platform provider.The central planner has restrictions on allocations. We characterize the optimal mechanism concerning his (her) revenue under...

We investigate combinatorial exchanges as a generalization of auctions and bilateral trades, where multiple heterogeneous commodities are initially possessed not only by a central planner but also by participants. We assume private values, quasi-linearity, risk neutrality, and independent type...

We model the stock market as a timing game, in which arbitrageurs who are not expected to be certainly rational compete over profit by bursting the bubble caused by investors? euphoria. The manager raises money by issuing shares and the arbitrageurs use leverage. If leverage is weakly regulated,...

We investigate the moral hazard problem in which a principal delegates multiple tasks to multiple workers. The principal imperfectly monitors their action choices by observing the public signals that are correlated with each other through a macro shock. He divides the workers into two groups and...

In this paper, we investigate the collective decision problem with incomplete information and side payments. We show that a direct mechanism associated with the social choice function that satisfies budget balancing, incentive compatibility, and interim individual rationality exists for generic...

This paper investigates unique implementation in large economies with incomplete information and interdependent values; we degenerate the common knowledge assumptions and assume that a central planner is unaware of the specifications of an environment. With a minor restriction on the class of...

The study of mechanism design is sometimes criticized, because the designed mechanisms depend on the fine detail of the model specification, and agents' behavior relies on the strong common knowledge assumptions on their rationality and others. Hence, the study of 'detail-free' mechanism design...

We investigate a game of delegated portfolio management such as hedge funds featuring risk-neutrality, hidden types, and hidden actions. We show that capital gain tax plays the decisive role in solving the incentive problem. We characterize the constrained optimal fee scheme and capital gain tax...

We investigate implementation of social choice functions where the central planner has no knowledge about the detail of model specifications, and only a few individuals participate in the mechanism. In contrast with the standard model of implementation, each agent has non-consequential moral...