We study incentive-compatible labour contracts in the case where individual productivity, preference for leisure and time preference rate are unobservable by the principal in a two-period model. We first reduce this three-dimensional problem to a standard one-dimensional screening problem....

We study incentive-compatible labor contracts in the case where both individual productivity and subjective discount rate are unobservable by the rm. We rst show that unidimensional manifolds of agents group on the same contract. High , low agents may choose the same contract as low , high...

This paper provides an existence theorem for a class of infinite-dimensional non-convex problems arising in symmetric and asymmetric information models. Sufficient conditions for monotonicity of solutions are also given. The proofs are very simple and rely on rearrangement techniques and the...

We establish duality, existence and uniqueness results for a class of mass transportations problems. We extend a technique of W. Gangbo [9] using the Euler Equation of the dual problem. This is done by introducing the h-Fenchel Transform and using its basic properties. The cost functions we...

Using a substitution property of worker’s types (productivity and time preference), we propose an explanation for both fixed-wages and wage differentials. Fixed-wages result in bunching at the optimum. Equally productive workers with different time preference accept different wages.