This chapter aims to quantify and compare inequalities of opportunity in health across European countries considering two alternative normative ways of treating the correlation between effort, as measured by lifestyles, and circumstances, as measured by parental and childhood characteristics,...

This article analyses the role played by childhood circumstances, especially social and family background in explaining health status among older adults. We explore the hypothesis of an intergenerational transmission of health inequalities using the French part of SHARE. As the impact of both...

Purpose: This paper aims to quantify inequalities of opportunities in health in Europe and to assess whether the way the correlation between effort towards health and circumstances empirically matters for the magnitude of inequalities of opportunities. Methodology: This paper considers two...

This article analyses unequal opportunities for health related to original class and family background in Europe. The literature has recently highlighted the influence of original class background on health in adulthood and the existence of transmission between the generations. The data from the...

Parmi les facteurs explicatifs proposés pour expliquer les inégalités sociales de santé, la littérature épidémiologique a récemment mis en avant l’influence du milieu social d’origine sur l’état de santé à l’âge adulte, cette influence résultant à la fois d’un effet...

Deux méthodes sont généralement envisagées pour l'évaluation des politiques de santé. L'approche coût-bénéfice s'appuie sur la somme des consentements individuels à payer : elle respecte les préférences individuelles mais elle donne une priorité aux préférences des plus riches car...

Les descendants des cadres dirigeants et professions intellectuelles ont-ils une meilleure santé que les descendants d’ouvriers ? Est-ce que la longévité des parents infl uence l’état de santé à l’âge adulte ? Ces deux questions interrogent l’existence d’inégalités des chances...

We completely characterize the set of second-best optimal "menus" of student-loan contracts in a simple economy with risky labour-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard and risk aversion. The model combines structured student loans and an elementary optimal income-tax problem à la...

A student's future log-wage is given by the sum of a skill premium and a random personal ‘ability’ term. Students observe only a private, noisy signal of their ability, and universities can condition admission decisions on the results of noisy tests. We assume first that universities are...