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Delegation of Monetary Policy: More than a Relocation of the Time-Inconsistency Problem
Driffill, John; Rotondi, Zeno - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
It has been argued that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank, which acts as an agent for the … that delegation enables a wider class of economies to sustain zero inflation than would be able to do so in its absence. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656362
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Independent but Accountable: Walsh Contracts and the Credibility Problem
Al-Nowaihi, A; Levine, Paul L - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996
credibility as a commitment device. But the contract’s strength is that renegotiation can be very visible and this facilitates a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124190
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Workers' Versus Bankers' Europe (II): Policy Externalities and Credibility in EMU
Bottazzi, Laura; Manasse, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998
In this paper we analyse how the creation of a single currency regime changes the strategic relationship between policy-makers, both within and across countries. In particular we look at the role of cross-country externalities and lack of commitment. When labour taxation is excessive, due to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136411
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Coordinating monetary and financial regulatory policies
Van der Ghote, Alejandro - 2018
How to conduct macro-prudential regulation? How to coordinate monetary policy and macro-prudential policy? To address …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856525
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Central Banks: Powerful, Political and Unaccountable?
Buiter, Willem H. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
Central banks’ economic and political importance has grown in advanced economies since the start of the Great Financial Crisis in 2007. An unwillingness or inability of governments to use countercyclical fiscal policy has made monetary policy the only stabilization tool in town. However, much...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084413
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Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth
Anderlini, Luca; Felli, Leonardo; Immordino, Giovanni; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We analyze the relationship between legal institutions, innovation and growth. We compare a rigid (law set ex-ante) legal system and a flexible one (law set after observing current technology). The flexible system dominates in terms of welfare, amount of innovation and output growth at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009148877
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Issue Linkage, Credible Delegation, and Policy Cooperation
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
This Paper, a thorough revision of Spagnolo (1996), addresses the following questions: What is the optimal design for a set of self-enforcing international policy agreements? How many and which issues should each agreement regulate? Are GATT’s constraints on issue linkage (cross-retaliation)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504790
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Delegation and the Ratchet Effect: Should Regulators Be Pro-Industry?
Currie, David; Levine, Paul L; Rickman, Neil - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
Delegation to independent bodies whose preference can be different from those of the government has been shown to have … delegation in the context of a cost-reimbursement procurement problem. Our solution combines several features of the modern … heterogeneity across regulators available. We find that delegation to an independent industry regulator, whose preferences are more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136782
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Central Bank Independence, Accountability and Transparency: Complements or Strategic Substitutes?
Hughes Hallett, Andrew; Libich, Jan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
‘commitment technologies’ that reduce inflation and build credibility. In addition, goal-transparency is shown to be socially …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123596
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Endogenous Policy Leads to Inefficient Risk-Sharing
Celentani, Marco; Conde-Ruiz, José Ignacio; Desmet, Klaus - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
We analyse risk-sharing and endogenous fiscal spending in a two-region model with sequentially complete markets. Fiscal policy is determined by majority voting. When policy setting is decentralized, regions choose pro-cyclical fiscal spending in an attempt to manipulate security prices to their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656441