Similar Search Results

Dessein, Wouter; Santos, Jesus - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This paper endogenizes coordination problems in organizations by allowing for both ex ante coordination of activities, using rules and task guidelines, and ex post coordination, using communication and broad job assignments. It shows that: (i) Task specialization and the division of labour is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497860

Clean Evidence on Peer Pressure

Falk, Armin; Ichino, Andrea - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

While confounding factors typically jeopardise the possibility of using observational data to measure peer effects, field experiments offer the possibility of obtaining clean evidence. In this Paper we measure the output of four randomly selected groups of individuals who were asked to fill...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123943

Politics in the Courtroom: Political Ideology and Jury Decision Making

Anwar, Shamena; Bayer, Patrick; Hjalmarsson, Randi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

This paper uses data from the Gothenburg District Court in Sweden and a research design that exploits the random assignment of politically appointed jurors (termed nämndemän) to make three contributions to the literature on jury decision-making: (i) an assessment of whether systematic biases...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011276386

Interactions Between Workers and the Technology of Production: Evidence from Professional Baseball

Gould, Eric D; Winter, Eyal - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

This paper examines how the effort choices of workers within the same firm interact with each other. In contrast to the existing literature, we show that workers can affect the productivity of their co-workers based on income maximization considerations, rather than relying on behavioural...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067635

Tractability in Incentive Contracting

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509464

Dynamic Incentive Accounts

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier; Sadzik, Tomasz; Sannikov, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008477185

Risk and the CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … regulation) do not affect pay. The strength of incentives depends only on the disutility of effort and is independent of risk and … risk aversion. If the CEO affects the volatility as well as mean of firm returns, incentives rise and are increasing in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008530386

Organizing for Synergies

Dessein, Wouter; Garicano, Luis; Gertner, Robert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

requires narrowly-focused incentives around their area of responsibility. Functional managers become biased toward excessive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114409

Incentives Versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sonnemans, Joep; van … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

validity of results obtained in lab experiments or from sports data. To address these concerns we conducted a field experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136509

The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment

Englmaier, Florian; Roider, Andreas; Sunde, Uwe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

tasks. We analyze the effects of the salience of incentives in a team production setting where the principal has an interest … in quantity and quality of output. We use data from a controlled field experiment that changed the communication of the … incentive system without changing the incentive system. The results indicate that salience of incentives itself is statistically …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084038

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last