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Independence before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design

Hughes Hallett, Andrew; Weymark, Diana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy are implemented in the second stage. When fiscal policy is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498019

The Effect of Monetary Unification on Public Debt and its Real Return

Beetsma, Roel; Vermeylen, Koen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We explore the implications of monetary unification for real interest rates and (relative) public debt levels. The adoption of a common monetary policy renders the risk-return characteristics of the participating countries more similar, so that the substitutability of their public debt increases...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498174

The Cost of Heterogeneity in a Monetary Union

Hughes Hallett, Andrew; Weymark, Diana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

In this Paper, we explore whether heterogeneity among union members could threaten the stability of the EMU. The types of heterogeneity we consider are (1) asymmetries in the transmission of monetary and fiscal policies, and (2) differences in national preferences for price stability, output...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656229

Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks

Frisell, Lars; Roszbach, Kasper F.; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

number of central banks in light of their complex role of inflation guardians, bankers’ banks, financial industry regulators …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656403

Monetary Union: The Ins and Outs of Strategic Delegation

Levine, Paul L; Pearlman, Joseph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

This paper addresses the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy in a closed trading bloc consisting of ‘ins’ forming a monetary union and ‘outs’ who retain monetary sovereignty. All governments can opt for a particular choice of institutional arrangement for their central bank (CB),...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661847

Two Naked Emperors? Concerns about the Stability and Growth Pact and Second Thoughts About Central Bank Independence

Buiter, Willem H. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This 2003 Institute for Fiscal Studies Lecture addresses two sets of issues relevant to current and prospective future E(M)U members: the consequences of the Stability and Growth Pact for fiscal-financial sustainability and macroeconomic stability, and some risks associated with operational...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662197

Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policymaking Institutions - Past Present and Future

Cukierman, Alex - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

relation between CBI and the performance of the economy. Section 3 discusses lessons from stabilization of inflation, reviews … price stability. The section discusses the risks associated with flexible inflation targeting, issues of accountability and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666788

The Political Economy of Inflation and Central Bank Independence

Herrendorf, Berthold; Neumann, Manfred J.M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

. Nevertheless, an independent central bank is found not to produce an inflation bias because it is accountable to the majority of … the population, which is not involuntarily unemployed. In contrast, government-dependence leads to an inflation bias and a … higher variability of inflation, but has an ambiguous effect on employment variability. The reason is that democratic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791443

Fiscal Constraints on Central Bank Independence and Price Stability

Canzoneri, Matthew B; Diba, Behzad - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

We use a new theory of price determination – developed by Woodford, Simms and others – to characterize central bank independence and price stability. If fiscal policy guarantees that the price level is determined independently of government’s present value budget constraint, we can say...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792408

Government Leadership and Central Bank Design

Hughes Hallett, Andrew; Weymark, Diana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

inflation and income inequality are reduced without sacrificing output growth if the government assumes a leadership role …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123515