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Government Leadership and Central Bank Design
Hughes Hallett, Andrew; Weymark, Diana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
inflation and income inequality are reduced without sacrificing output growth if the government assumes a leadership role …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123515
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A Small Corner of Intertemporal Public Finance - New Developments in Monetary Economics: Two Ghosts, Two Eccentricities, a Fallacy, a Mirage and a Mythos
Buiter, Willem H. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
Monetary theory and policy are part of intertemporal public finance. This Paper reviews some interesting recent developments. The two ghosts are the venerable liquidity trap and the Pigou effect or real balance effect. The eccentricities are negative nominal interest rates and the helicopter...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123549
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Central Bank Independence, Accountability and Transparency: Complements or Strategic Substitutes?
Hughes Hallett, Andrew; Libich, Jan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
. It shows that goal-independence and goal-transparency (an explicit inflation target) at the central bank are substitute … ‘commitment technologies’ that reduce inflation and build credibility. In addition, goal-transparency is shown to be socially … deficit’, institutional reforms should follow the Bank of England scenario, in which an explicit inflation target is first …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123596
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An Independent Central Bank Faced With Elected Governments
Demertzis, Maria; Hughes Hallett, Andrew - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
The literature argues that the benefits of an independent Central Bank accrue at no cost to the real side. In this paper, we argue that the lack of correlation between monetary autonomy and output variability is due to the proactive role of fiscal policy when faced with rigid monetary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124130
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Independence before Conservatism: Transparency, Politics and Central Bank Design
Hughes Hallett, Andrew; Weymark, Diana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
The problem of monetary policy delegation is formulated as a two-stage game between the government and the central bank. In the first stage the government chooses the institutional design of the central bank. Monetary and fiscal policy are implemented in the second stage. When fiscal policy is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498019
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The Effect of Monetary Unification on Public Debt and its Real Return
Beetsma, Roel; Vermeylen, Koen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
We explore the implications of monetary unification for real interest rates and (relative) public debt levels. The adoption of a common monetary policy renders the risk-return characteristics of the participating countries more similar, so that the substitutability of their public debt increases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498174
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The Cost of Heterogeneity in a Monetary Union
Hughes Hallett, Andrew; Weymark, Diana - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
In this Paper, we explore whether heterogeneity among union members could threaten the stability of the EMU. The types of heterogeneity we consider are (1) asymmetries in the transmission of monetary and fiscal policies, and (2) differences in national preferences for price stability, output...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656229
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The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Politics in Europe
Alesina, Alberto F; Grilli, Vittorio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1991
inflation and stabilization. We analyse the role of the political independence of the ECB and the effect on policy choices of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005281279
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The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence
Herrendorf, Berthold; Neumann, Manfred J.M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998
characterize equilibrium inflation and employment under central bank dependence and independence. We also endogenize the decisions … countries, independence is negatively correlated with average inflation and inflation variability and uncorrelated with …; (iii) some independent central banks do not generate an inflation bias yet stabilize. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114339
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Fiscal Constraints on Central Bank Independence and Price Stability
Canzoneri, Matthew B; Diba, Behzad - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996
We use a new theory of price determination – developed by Woodford, Simms and others – to characterize central bank independence and price stability. If fiscal policy guarantees that the price level is determined independently of government’s present value budget constraint, we can say...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792408