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Hold-Up, Industrial Relations and Takeover Threats
Chemla, Gilles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998
dramatically affect the way in which an increase in workers' bargaining power affects (under)investment. Without loss of generality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005656178
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Intellectual Property Rights and Efficient Firm Organization
Ponzetto, Giacomo AM - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
dimensions of non- contractible investment. In equilibrium, the first best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and … declines: the final producer must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in their investment; or else risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084191
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Information and the Optimal Ownership Structure of Firms
Matouschek, Niko - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
I develop a property rights theory of the firm in which managers bargain over the sharing of quasi-rents in the presence of private information. I analyse the interdependence between the ownership structure of firms and the bargaining inefficiency that is due to the presence of private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662109
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Foreign Direct Investment and Spillovers through Backward Linkages
Matouschek, Niko - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
. Finally, the MNC will use only one independent supplier if its own investment is very supplier specific, competition between …Foreign direct investment projects can generate spillovers through backward linkages in the host economy. This will be … supplier arrangement. The MNC will produce the inputs itself if the supplier's investment is neither too human capital nor too …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792033
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The Determinants of Privatized Enterprise Performance in Russia
Angelucci, Manuela; Bevan, Alan; Estrin, Saul; Fennema, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
; corporate governance; market structures and competition; and financial constraints. We conclude that private ownership and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666814
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Delegated Job Design
Hvide, Hans K; Kaplan, Todd - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
Why do firms delegate job design decisions to workers, and what are the implications of such delegation? We develop a private-information based theory of delegation, where delegation enables high-ability workers to signal their ability by choosing difficult tasks. Such signalling provides a more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123930
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Bargaining with Imperfect Enforcement
White, Lucy; Williams, Mark - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
The game-theoretic bargaining literature insists on non-cooperative bargaining procedure but allows 'cooperative' implementation of agreements. The effect of this is to allow free-reign of bargaining power with no check upon it. In reality, courts cannot implement agreements costlessly, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662212
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The Internal Governance of Firms
Acharya, Viral V; Myers, Stewart C; Rajan, Raghuram G - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
theory of investment and dividend policy, where dividends are paid by self-interested CEOs to maintain a balance between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980207
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Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123963
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Bottom-Up Corporate Governance
Landier, Augustin; Sraer, David; Thesmar, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
In many instances, 'independently-minded' top-ranking executives can impose strong discipline on their CEO, even though they are formally under his authority. This paper argues that the use of such a disciplining mechanism is a key feature of good corporate governance. We provide robust...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136453