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Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers

Burkart, Mike; Raff, Konrad - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by offering acquisition opportunities to successful … performance-based pay are non-monotonic in the intensity of the takeover threat. In firms with weak boards, turnover (performance …-based pay) increases (decreases) with the intensity of the takeover threat. When choosing its acquisition policy and the quality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083799

The Choice of Honesty: An Experiment Regarding Heterogeneous Responses to Situational Social Norms

Gibson, Rajna; Tanner, Carmen; Wagner, Alexander F - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We conduct a laboratory experiment in which we expose participants to situational social norms of approval or disapproval of lying. While participants on average conform to the situational pressure, the results highlight important differences in individual reactions. Situational norms crowd out...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145452

Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Risk: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Albuquerque, Rui; Durnev, Artyom; Koskinen, Yrjö - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

This paper presents an industry equilibrium model where firms can choose to engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. We model CSR activities as an investment in customer loyalty and show that CSR decreases systematic risk and increases firm value. These effects are stronger...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083749

Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a unifying framework. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272716

Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections

Do, Quoc-Anh; Lee, Yen-Teik; Nguyen, Bang Dang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

Using the regression discontinuity design of close gubernatorial elections in the U.S., we identify a significant and positive impact of the social networks of corporate directors and politicians on firm value. Firms connected to elected governors increase their value by 3.89%. Political...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249372

Access to Public Capital Markets and Employment Growth

Borisov, Alexander; Ellul, Andrew; Sevilir, Merih - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

This paper investigates the importance of accessing public capital markets through an initial public offering (IPO), and the consequent relaxation of firms’ financial constraints, for firm-level long term employment decisions. We find that firms significantly increase post-IPO investment in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249379

Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation

Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock-based incentives elicit not only productive effort, but also costly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567

On the Real Effects of Bank Bailouts: Micro-Evidence from Japan

Giannetti, Mariassunta; Simonov, Andrei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

Exploiting the Japanese banking crisis as a laboratory, we provide firm-level evidence on the real effects of bank bailouts. Government recapitalizations result in positive abnormal returns for the clients of recapitalized banks. After recapitalizations, banks extend larger loans to their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014571

Quantifying private benefits of control from a structural model of block trades

Albuquerque, Rui; Schroth, Enrique - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study the determinants of private benefits of control in negotiated block transactions. We estimate the block pricing model in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (2000) explicitly accounting for both block premia and block discounts in the data. The evidence suggests that the occurrence of a block...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004969131

Tractability in Incentive Contracting

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008509464

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