Showing 1 - 10 of 120
be derived from the recent outcomes of climate negotiations. Even though an equitable sharing of the costs of controlling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136584
and in actual policymaking, is to link negotiations on climate change control with decisions concerning international R …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661540
We analyze incentives to develop entrepreneurial ideas for venture capitalists (VCs) and incumbent firms. If VCs are sufficiently better at judging an idea's value and if it is sufficiently more costly to patent low than high value ideas, VCs acquire valuable ideas, develop them beyond the level...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643508
In this Paper we show that a simple model of fairness preferences explains major experimental regularities of common pool resource (CPR) experiments. The evidence indicates that in standard CPR games without communication and without sanctioning possibilities inefficient excess appropriation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123667
The paper analyses a situation in which negotiations take place between a party consisting of a single decision … negotiations with a group of different workers' unions, disarmament negotiations with a group of allied countries, etc. In the … paper, however, the model is directly applied to the case of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. In this case the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123724
We investigate firms' incentives for cost reduction in the first price sealed bid auction, a format largely used for procurement. A central feature of the model is that we allow firms to be heterogeneous. Though private value first price auctions are not games with monotonic best responses, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123864
In repeated normal-form games, simple penal codes (Abreu 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. We provide two examples illustrating that a subgame-perfect outcome...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124002
The paper analyses the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the EU's Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136464
This paper explains why people value self-confidence, and how this concern shapes their informational strategies and intertemporal decisions. The theory has applications in areas as diverse as labour supply, savings and investment, or education and career decisions. People generally have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136755
This Paper studies the internal commitment mechanisms or ‘personal rules’ (diets, exercise regimens, resolutions, moral or religious precepts, etc.) through which people seek to achieve self-control. Our theory is based on the idea of self-reputation over one’s willpower, which potentially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136762